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BENJAMIN J. ROESCH* 
Alaska is unique among the United States in adopting the English 
Rule, which shifts a portion of the prevailing party’s legal fees to 
the losing party.  This Comment analyzes one consequence of that 
doctrine, namely the applicability of Alaska Civil Rule 68, 
Alaska’s fee-shifting offer of judgment statute, in federal diversity 
actions under the Supreme Court’s Erie-Hanna jurisprudence.  It 
concludes that despite sharing nearly identical text with the federal 
offer of judgment rule, Federal Rule 68, the substantially different 
purposes of the two Rules indicate that no “direct conflict” exists 
and that the substance of Alaska Civil Rule 68 applies in federal 
diversity actions.  The Comment then uses the principles de-
rived from this analysis to evaluate the Erie-Hanna analysis em-
ployed by several courts in determining whether to apply state of-
fer of judgment statutes in diversity actions.  Finally, it concludes 
that these courts have fallen short of the ideal analysis as articu-
lated in the Supreme Court’s recent Gasperini decision in three 
distinct ways. 
I.  INTRODUCTION 
Few of the Supreme Court’s lines of decision have evoked as 
much anguish among law students, criticism from scholars, uncer-
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tainty among practitioners, and refinements from jurists as has Erie 
Railroad Co. v. Tompkins1 and its progeny.  Essentially, Erie held 
that all state substantive law must apply in federal diversity ac-
tions.2  Some of the choice of law determinations required by this 
principle are more difficult than others.  Theoretically, determining 
whether to apply state law or an apparently applicable Federal 
Rule of Civil Procedure should be easy for federal courts hearing 
diversity cases.  Stated generally, the test is: if the federal rule is 
broad enough to govern—that there is a “direct collision” between 
the federal rule and the competing state law—then the federal rule 
controls.3 
The Federal Rules of Civil Procedure are intended to provide 
a singular, uniform method for adjudicating substantive rights in 
federal court.  Determining whether such a federal rule applies 
should be a matter of “plain meaning.”4  However, when focusing 
on the intended scope and purpose of the federal rule vis-à-vis the 
competing state rule and when unique or unusual state substantive 
rights are implicated, the inquiry presents special challenges.  After 
the Supreme Court’s refinement of the Erie doctrine in Gasperini v. 
Center for Humanities, Inc.,5 an especially careful analysis of the 
purposes of both the relevant federal rule and the state statute is 
required to avoid the unnecessary and undesirable federal abroga-
tion of state substantive law.  The Alaska Rules of Civil Procedure 
include one such unique system, requiring a heightened level of 
care in evaluating which set of rules to apply. 
Unlike the rest of the nation, Alaska does not follow the 
“American Rule,” under which each party bears its own litigation 
costs.6  Instead, since its territorial days in the early twentieth cen-
tury, Alaska law has provided for the shifting of at least part of the 
prevailing party’s attorneys’ fees to the losing side.7  This fee-
shifting system has undergone several rounds of discussion and re-
vision,8 and debate over its merits has consumed many pages in this 
 
 1. 304 U.S. 64 (1938). 
 2. Id. at 79–80. 
 3. To be more precise, the federal rule controls in this situation unless it is 
invalid as outside the rulemaking authority of the Federal Rules Enabling Act, 28 
U.S.C. §§ 2071–77 (2000), or is in some other way unconstitutional.  See Hanna v. 
Plumer, 380 U.S. 460, 470–72 (1965). 
 4. See Walker v. Armco Steel Corp., 446 U.S. 740, 750 n.9 (1980). 
 5. 518 U.S. 415 (1996). 
 6. Kevin Michael Kordziel, Rule 82 Revisited: Attorney Fee Shifting in Alaska, 
10 ALASKA L. REV. 429, 429 (1993). 
 7. Id. at 431–32. 
 8. See generally id. at 440–48. 
03__ROESCH.DOC 6/5/2006  4:00 PM 
2006] ERIE SIMILARITIES 83 
Law Review and other Alaska legal publications.9  Most of this 
scholarship has focused on the theoretical merits and empirically 
measurable effects of Alaska’s fee-shifting regime.10 
Today, Alaska Civil Rule 82 expresses a comprehensive right 
of the prevailing party in litigation to recover attorneys’ fees.11  The 
scope of this right is defined in Alaska Civil Rule 82 and several 
other statutes, including Alaska Civil Rule 68, which allows either 
party to recover additional attorneys’ fees if they made an offer of 
judgment12 that was rejected by the other party but then not 
matched or bettered after the trial.13  Rule 68 is therefore a device 
to encourage settlement.  It also confers “prevailing party” status 
on, and requires an enhanced award of attorneys’ fees to, a party 
making an unaccepted offer that proves to be more favorable to the 
offeree than the litigation’s outcome.14 
In diversity cases governed by Alaska law, Alaska Civil Rule 
68 encounters apparent conflict with its federal counterpart, Fed-
eral Rule of Civil Procedure 68.  Federal Rule 68 provides that de-
fendants who make unaccepted offers of judgment that prove to be 
 
 9. See, e.g., id.; A.J. TOMKINS & T.E. WILLGING, TAXATION OF ATTORNEYS’ 
FEES: PRACTICES IN ENGLISH, ALASKAN, AND FEDERAL COURTS (Federal Judicial 
Center 1986); Susanne Di Pietro & Teresa W. Carns, Alaska’s English Rule: At-
torney’s Fee Shifting in Civil Cases, 13 ALASKA L. REV. 33 (1996); Gregory J. 
Hughes, Award of Attorney’s Fees in Alaska: An Analysis of Rule 82, 4 UCLA-
ALASKA L. REV. 129 (1974); Andrew J. Kleinfeld, On Shifting Attorneys’ Fees in 
Alaska: A Rebuttal, 24 JUDGES’ J., Summer 1985, at 38; Gerald Z. Marer and John 
F. Schuck, Alaska’s Rule 82 Fees: A Trap for Unwary Insurers, 57 DEF. COUNSEL J. 
214 (1990); Abizer Zanzi, Note, The Constitutional Battle Over the Public Interest 
Litigant Exception to Rule 82, 21 ALASKA L. REV. 329 (2004). 
 10. See generally id. 
 11. See ALASKA R. CIV. P. 82. 
 12. An “offer of judgment” is “a settlement offer by one party to allow a speci-
fied judgment to be taken against the party.”  BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 1114 
(8th ed. 2004). 
 13. ALASKA R. CIV. P. 68 
 14. See id.  Offer of judgment rules made pursuant to Alaska Civil Rule 68 
may be regarded by litigants as “successful” in two situations.  First, an accepted 
offer may be “successful” if it results in settlement of the case on favorable, or at 
least acceptable, terms.  Because accepted offers do not result in further litigation, 
this Comment will set them to one side.  Second, an unaccepted offer may be re-
garded as “successful” if the final judgment is sufficiently less favorable to the 
offeree so that the offeror is entitled to an award of enhanced attorneys’ fees un-
der the Rule.  See id.  This Comment is primarily concerned with offers that are 
“successful” in this second sense.  For ease of discussion, this Comment will refer 
to unaccepted offers that result in an award of enhanced attorneys’ fees as “fee-
inducing” offers. 
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more favorable than the plaintiff’s ultimate recovery are entitled to 
costs incurred after the offer of judgment was extended.15  At issue, 
then, are the consequences of these “fee-inducing” offers.  Courts 
across the country have split on when and whether various state 
rules awarding attorneys’ fees to litigants who make “fee-inducing” 
offers of judgment may be applied by a federal court sitting in di-
versity jurisdiction.16 
As noted above, the critical question for a federal court sitting 
in diversity jurisdiction is whether there is a “direct collision” be-
tween the rules.17  This turns on the intended scope and purpose of 
each rule.18  An examination of the objectives underlying Alaska 
Civil Rule 68 and Federal Rule 68 reveals important differences.  
Federal Rule 68 was intended to promote settlement of lawsuits by 
shifting costs onto plaintiffs who recover less at trial than they were 
offered pursuant to the Rule and to maintain the status quo Ameri-
can Rule with respect to attorneys’ fee awards.19  Alaska Civil Rule 
68 serves the same settlement-encouraging purpose but also oper-
ates to identify the prevailing party for all attorneys’ fees purposes 
under Alaska’s system of fee-shifting. 
Thus, the core difference stems from the divergent assump-
tions underlying the Alaska and federal legal systems with respect 
to attorneys’ fees.  When background assumptions upon which fed-
eral procedural and state substantive rules are based diverge, the 
two rules will be in direct conflict only rarely.  Precisely because 
Alaska’s fee-shifting scheme does not share the American Rule 
assumption of other states, this insight into Federal Rule 68 may 
have limited application in federal diversity cases of state offer of 
judgment rules outside Alaska. 
However, like the lessons learned from Alaska’s experience 
with fee-shifting, the lessons learned from the inquiry into the in-
tended scope and purposes of Alaska Rule 68 and Federal Rule 68 
are relevant to practitioners and courts around the nation.20  The 
inquiry reveals a number of pitfalls that federal courts confronted 
with potentially conflicting federal and state rules of civil procedure 
must avoid in determining when there is a “direct collision” be-
tween those rules.21  Pre- and post-Gasperini cases deal with con-
 
 15. See FED. R. CIV. P. 68. 
 16. See discussion infra Part IV.A. 
 17. See Hanna v. Plumer, 380 U.S. 460, 472 (1965). 
 18. See, e.g., Gasperini v. Ctr. for Humanities, Inc., 518 U.S. 415, 426 (1996); 
Walker v. Armco Steel Corp., 446 U.S. 740, 752 (1980). 
 19. See Marek v. Chesney, 473 U.S. 1, 10 (1985). 
 20. See Di Pietro & Carns, supra note 9, at 84–85. 
 21. See Hanna, 380 U.S. at 472. 
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flicts between state laws and Federal Rule 68 in several problem-
atic ways: 1) by deciding the case on a “piecemeal” basis, limiting 
the holding to the facts and consequently avoiding the hardest 
questions about the potential conflict between state and federal 
rules; 2) by reading the federal rule broadly without conducting a 
meaningful inquiry into the purposes and intended scope of the 
federal and state rules; and 3) by creating a hybrid substantive law.  
None of these approaches fulfills the command of Gasperini to as-
certain the scope and purpose of the federal and state laws.22 
In Part II, this Comment examines the Alaska fee-shifting sys-
tem and concludes that Alaska Civil Rule 68 is an integral part of 
Alaska’s substantive right to attorneys’ fees.  Part III places Rule 
68 within the framework of case law generated from the Erie deci-
sion.  Part III.A consists of a short exposition of Erie and attempts 
to distill the core rules and policies that determine when state law is 
to be applied in federal diversity cases.  Part III.B investigates the 
intent of Federal Rule 68 and the decisions interpreting it.  Part 
III.C compares the purposes and functions of Alaska Rule 68 and 
Federal Rule 68 and finds that because Federal Rule 68 was never 
intended to serve the same purpose as the Alaska rule, the Alaska 
rule may be applied in federal diversity actions.  Part IV explores 
the implications of this understanding for other states’ offer of 
judgment rules and for Erie analysis involving anomalous state 
laws. 
II.  THE RIGHT TO ATTORNEYS’ FEES UNDER ALASKA CIVIL 
RULE 68 IS A SUBSTANTIVE RIGHT INCORPORATED BY THE LEG-
ISLATURE INTO ALASKA CIVIL RULE 82(A) 
Alaska Rule 82 was adopted in 1959.23  It set out a schedule for 
attorneys’ fee awards to be adhered to “[u]nless the court, in its 
discretion, otherwise directs.”24  Rule 82(a) currently articulates a 
right to attorneys’ fees for prevailing parties in litigation governed 
by Alaska law.25  Ordinarily, fees are awarded according to the 
schedules in subsections (b)(1) and (b)(2), but in 1993, the Alaska 
Supreme Court added subsections (b)(3)(A) through (K), which 
permit a court to deviate from the schedules.26  Alaska Rule 82(a) 
 
 22. See Gasperini, 518 U.S. at 426. 
 23. Alaska Sup. Ct. Order No. 5, effective Oct. 9, 1959. 
 24. Id. 
 25. See ALASKA R. CIV. P. 82(a). 
 26. Alaska Sup. Ct. Order No. 1118, effective July 15, 1993.  See Monzingo v. 
Alaska Air Group, Inc., 112 P.3d 655, 665 (Alaska 2005) (requiring trial court to 
give “adequate consideration” to Rule 82(b)(3) factors raised by parties). 
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requires a court to deviate from these schedules “as otherwise pro-
vided by law.”27  Rule 82(a), therefore, incorporates by reference 
other sources defining the right to attorneys’ fees.28  Some of these 
definitions hinge on the substance of the statute underlying the 
claim.29  Others turn on the special circumstances and conduct of 
particular litigation.30 
Alaska Rule 82 straddles a fine line between the policies of re-
ducing litigation and allowing access to the courts by parties with 
good faith claims.31  At times, certain justices of the Alaska Su-
preme Court have expressed concern that Rule 82’s litigation-
reducing effectiveness might be too great.32  “[F]inancially ruinous” 
attorneys’ fee awards might deter good faith civil litigants from ac-
cessing the courts.33  Especially with regard to public interest liti-
gants—those whose litigation stands to benefit a wide group of 
people and who do not have sufficient economic incentive to bring 
suit—the risk of paying the other party’s attorneys’ fees might pre-
vent meritorious claims.34  The Alaska Supreme Court therefore 
created a public interest litigant exception under which such liti-
gants were exempt from paying attorneys’ fee awards when they 
lost and received full reasonable attorneys’ fees when they pre-
 
 27. ALASKA R. CIV. P. 82(a). 
 28. See id. 
 29. See, e.g., ALASKA STAT. § 09.60.070 (2004) (victims of serious crimes); 
ALASKA STAT. § 45.50.537 (2004) (unfair trade practices and consumer protec-
tion). 
 30. See, e.g., ALASKA STAT. § 09.60.015 (2004) (allowing “a reasonable amount 
to be fixed by the court as attorney fees” in small claims actions); ALASKA STAT. § 
45.50.537(b) (providing for award of full reasonable attorneys’ fees to prevailing 
defendant in frivolous fair trade and consumer protection case). 
 31. This Comment will not discuss the wisdom or effectiveness in achieving 
this balance, which has been examined elsewhere.  See generally Di Pietro & 
Carns, supra note 9, at 84–90 (making recommendations for amendments to 
Alaska Civil Rule 82 after a statistical analysis of its effects on litigation in 
Alaska); Kordziel, supra note 6, at 453–64 (concluding that Alaska Civil Rule 82 
prevents middle-income, non-judgment-proof persons with potential claims from 
bringing those claims or litigating them aggressively). 
 32. See, e.g., Bozarth v. Atlantic Richfield Oil Co., 833 P.2d 2, 6 (Alaska 1992) 
(Matthews, J., dissenting in part) (proposing that “in determining what fees consti-
tute a ‘reasonable amount’ under Civil Rule 82(a)(1), trial courts must consider 
whether the award is so great that it imposes an intolerable burden on a losing 
litigant which, in effect, denies the litigant’s right of access to the courts”). 
 33. See Reid v. Williams, 964 P.2d 453, 462 (Alaska 1998). 
 34. See Municipality of Anchorage v. Citizens for Representative Governance, 
880 P.2d 1058, 1061–62 (Alaska 1994) (defining “public interest litigant”). 
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vailed.35  Although largely abrogated by statute,36 the public interest 
litigant exception suggests a persistent uneasiness over the poten-
tial deterrent effect of Alaska Rule 82 on plaintiffs with meritori-
ous claims. 
Alaska Rule 68 also circumscribes the right to attorneys’ fees.37  
When Rule 68 was initially adopted in 1959, it provided only for an 
increased rate of prejudgment interest to the successful offeror.38  
The Alaska Supreme Court held that the 1993 amendments to Rule 
82 allowed, but did not require, the trial court to consider unac-
cepted Rule 68 offers of judgment when awarding attorneys’ fees 
under Rule 82.39  The court essentially incorporated the Rule 68 
offer of judgment into Rule 82(b)(3)’s factors for considering de-
viation from the ordinary schedule of attorneys’ fee awards.40  This 
permitted the trial court to award increased fees to the offeror, 
even if the offeror had not prevailed in every aspect of the litiga-
tion.41 
Such was the state of Alaska Rule 68 when the Ninth Circuit 
Court of Appeals decided Home Indemnity Co. v. Lane Powell 
Moss & Miller.42  The Home Indemnity panel faced the issue of 
whether Alaska Statute section 09.30.065’s enhanced prejudgment 
interest rate applied.  The court refused to characterize section 
09.30.065 as a substantive prejudgment interest statute because it 
 
 35. Anchorage Daily News v. Anchorage Sch. Dist., 803 P.2d 402, 404 (Alaska 
1990) (holding prevailing public interest litigants entitled to “full amount of its 
attorneys’ fees, to the extent that they are otherwise reasonable”); Anchorage v. 
McCabe, 568 P.2d 986, 993–94 (Alaska 1977) (noting that no attorneys’ fees may 
be awarded against unsuccessful public interest litigant and holding that the trial 
court may “award full attorney’s fees” to successful public interest litigants in its 
discretion).  For a thorough analysis of the public interest litigant exception and its 
statutory restrictions, see generally Zanzi, supra note 9. 
 36. See ALASKA STAT. § 09.60.010(b) (2004). 
 37. See ALASKA R. CIV. P. 68. 
 38. Alaska Sup. Ct. Order No. 5, effective Oct. 9, 1959. 
 39. Fairbanks N. Star Borough v. Lakeview Enters., Inc., 897 P.2d 47, 62 
(Alaska 1995). 
 40. See id. at 61–62. 
 41. For example, after the 1993 amendment, the court might not award attor-
neys’ fees to a plaintiff even though the plaintiff received some recovery less than 
the defendant’s Rule 68 offer and would otherwise have been entitled to attor-
neys’ fees as the prevailing party.  Or the court might award enhanced attorneys’ 
fees to the plaintiff even if most claims were dismissed, if the plaintiff recovered 
more on the surviving claim or claims than it had offered to settle for under 
Alaska Civil Rule 68. 
 42. 43 F.3d 1322 (9th Cir. 1995). 
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characterized Rule 68 as “punitive in nature.”43  The court based 
this distinction on dicta in the Alaska Supreme Court’s opinion in 
Farr v. Stepp.44  The Farr court, however, merely noted the punitive 
aspect of Alaska Rule 68 and did not create any punitive-
substantive distinction.45 
Based on this distinction, the Home Indemnity court held that 
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 68, which does not provide for ei-
ther offers of judgment by plaintiffs or an enhanced award of pre-
judgment interest in such a case, governed.46  The court seems to 
have substituted a punitive-substantive test for the procedural-
substantive determination called for under Erie.  However, the fact 
that former Alaska Rule 68’s prejudgment interest provision was 
“punitive in nature” does not preclude it from being “substantive” 
for Erie purposes.  In fact, case law suggests that the opposite is 
true—for state-created fee-shifting schemes, state law governs the 
amount awarded as punitive damages in federal diversity actions, 
subject to an ultimate federal constitutional check for exorbitance.47 
I believe that Home Indemnity was incorrectly decided and is 
therefore not controlling with respect to attorneys’ fees awards un-
der Alaska Rules 68 and 82.  Furthermore, even if it is not over-
ruled, its logic should not be extended to cover the current version 
of Alaska Rule 68.48  In 1995, when Home Indemnity was decided, 
Alaska Rule 68 was not as integrally related to Alaska Rule 82 as it 
is now.49 
 
 43. Id. at 1332. 
 44. 788 P.2d 35, 37 (Alaska 1990). 
 45. See id. (noting that “the superior court applied the penal costs and sanc-
tions provided for in Civil Rule 68(b)(1)” in recounting the case’s procedural his-
tory). 
 46. Home Indemnity, 43 F.3d at 1332. 
 47. Gasperini v. Ctr. for Humanities, Inc., 518 U.S. 415, 431 n.12 (1996); see 
S.A. Healy Co. v. Milwaukee Metro. Sewage Dist., 60 F.3d 305, 311 (7th Cir. 1995) 
(stating that when there is “a rule awarding successful plaintiffs punitive damages 
on top of compensatory damages . . . there is no doubt that [it] . . . would be appli-
cable in diversity suits under Erie”). 
 48. Cf. Fairbanks N. Star Borough v. Lakeview Enters., Inc., 897 P.2d 47, 61 
(Alaska 1995) (“Given these [1993] amendments, our pre-amendment decisions 
discussing the impact of a successful Rule 68 offer on attorney’s fees awards have 
limited application.”).  It should be noted that Farr, on which Home Indemnity 
was based, was one such “pre-amendment decision” because it was decided in 
1990.  See Farr, 788 P.2d 35. 
 49. See supra notes 36–40 and accompanying text. 
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In 1997, the Alaska Legislature amended Alaska Statute sec-
tion 09.30.065—the statute upon which Rule 68 is based50—to re-
quire that an offeree who had not accepted an offer that turned out 
to be more than five percent less favorable than the ultimate judg-
ment “pay reasonable actual attorney fees incurred by the offeror 
from the date the offer was made.”51  The legislature intended this 
amendment to effect a change to Alaska Rule 82.52  It stated that 
the amendment had “the effect of amending Rules 68 and 82, 
Alaska Rules of Civil Procedure, by requiring the offeree to pay 
costs and reasonable actual attorney fees on a sliding scale of per-
centages in certain cases, by eliminating provisions relating to in-
terest, and by changing provisions related to attorneys’ fee 
awards.”53 
The 1997 amendment altered the relationship between Alaska 
Rule 68 and Alaska Rule 82.54  Most importantly, it changed the 
subsection of Rule 82 to which Rule 68 offers of judgment ap-
plied.55  Previously, offers of judgment were relevant considerations 
in Rule 82(b)(3)’s list of factors in determining whether to deviate 
from the attorneys’ fees schedule in subsections (b)(1) and (b)(2).56  
After the amendment, Rule 68 offers were essentially incorporated 
into Rule 82(a)’s declaration of a right to attorneys’ fees.57  Thus, 
the amendment’s effect was to require what the court in Fairbanks 
North Star Borough v. Lakeview Enterprises, Inc. had allowed: the 
use of Alaska Rule 68 offers of judgment in awarding attorneys’ 
fees.58 
Moreover, Rule 68 offers became a second way to determine 
“prevailing party” status.  Traditionally, the prevailing party was 
the one who won “on the main issue of the case.”59  However, when 
 
 50. For ease of discussion, this Comment will refer to the legal basis for attor-
neys’ fee awards under Alaska law as “Alaska Civil Rule 68.”  This reference 
should be read as including Alaska Statute section 09.30.065. Similarly, references 
to Alaska Civil Rule 82 should be understood as implicating its underlying statute, 
Alaska Statute section 09.60.010. 
 51. 1997 Alaska Sess. Laws 10. 
 52. See id. at 25. 
 53. Id. 
 54. See id. 
 55. See id. 
 56. Fairbanks N. Star Borough v. Lakeview Enters., Inc., 897 P.2d 47, 62 
(Alaska 1995). 
 57. See 1997 Alaska Sess. Laws 25. 
 58. See id.; Lakeview Enters., 897 P.2d 47. 
 59. See, e.g., Halloran v. State, Div. of Elections, 115 P.3d 547, 553 (Alaska 
2005). 
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a party makes a successful Rule 68 offer, the offeror is the prevail-
ing party for Rule 82 purposes.60  Alaska Rule 68 is unlike other 
states’ offer of judgment rules in that it actually defines the “win-
ner” and “loser” in the litigation, rather than merely awarding fees 
for declining a more favorable offer.  Understood as such, Alaska 
Rule 68 is an integral part of the substantive right to attorneys’ fees 
articulated in Rule 82(a).    
Rules that shift attorneys’ fees to the losing party are generally 
considered “substantive” and applied as a rule of law in diversity 
cases.61  However, as noted above, Alaska Rule 68 encounters po-
tential conflict with Federal Rule 68 in diversity cases.  In deter-
mining which rule applies to diversity actions arising under Alaska 
law, we must enter the perilous domain of Erie and its progeny. 
III.  ALASKA CIVIL RULE 68 WITHIN THE ERIE FRAMEWORK 
A. A Short Summary of the Erie Doctrine62 
Until 1938, federal courts created a general federal common 
law to govern diversity actions under the Rules of Decision Act 
(“RDA”).63  In Erie, the Supreme Court changed course, holding 
that the RDA required federal courts to apply substantive state 
common law in diversity actions.64  The Erie decision sought to re-
duce the incentive for “forum shopping” by litigants hoping for 
more favorable substantive law in federal rather than state court, 
and the inequitable application of law to the detriment of victims of 
forum shopping.65   In 1934 Congress adopted the Rules Ena-
 
 60. ALASKA R. CIV. P. 68(c). 
 61. See, e.g., Alyeska Pipeline Serv. Co. v. Wilderness Soc’y, 421 U.S. 240, 259 
n.31 (1975).  United States District Court for the District of Alaska Local Rule 
54.3(a)(2) therefore requires that a motion for attorneys’ fees “set forth the au-
thority for the award, whether Rule 82, Alaska Rules of Civil Procedure, a federal 
statute, contractual provision, or other grounds entitling the moving party to the 
award.”  D. Alaska R. 54.3(a)(2). 
 62. Erie and its progeny have been described extensively elsewhere.  See, e.g., 
C. Douglas Floyd, Erie Awry: A Comment on Gasperini v. Center for Humanities, 
Inc., 1997 B.Y.U. L. REV. 267 (1997).  Because this Comment deals with only one 
aspect of the Erie framework—the detection of “direct collisions” between federal 
and state law—it contains only a cursory overview. 
 63. Judiciary Act of 1789, § 34, 1 Stat. 73 (codified as amended at 28 U.S.C. § 
1652 (2000)); Swift v. Tyson, 41 U.S. (16 Pet.) 1, 18–19 (1842). 
 64. Erie R.R. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64 (1938). 
 65. See Walker v. Armco Steel Corp., 446 U.S. 740, 747 (1980) (quoting Hanna 
v. Plumer, 380 U.S. 460, 468 (1965)). 
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bling Act (“REA”).66  The Federal Rules of Civil Procedure were 
also promulgated in accordance with the REA to set out proce-
dural rules for actions in federal court, including diversity actions.67  
The Federal Rules cover many, but not all, procedural questions in 
federal court.68 
Under Erie’s progeny, if no federal rule applies, either federal 
law under the RDA or the applicable state rule will govern the is-
sue.69  To resolve which rule governs, a court must apply the out-
come-determinative test of Guaranty Trust Co. v. York.70  This test 
hinges on whether application of federal rather than state policy 
affects the case result in such a way as to give a party incentive to 
choose federal over state court.71  If the answer is no, then federal 
policy governs.72  If the answer is yes, then the court must perform a 
balancing test weighing the relative importance of both the state 
and federal policies and the extent to which the outcome will be 
affected.73 
For example, in Ragan v. Merchants Transfer & Warehouse 
Co.,74 the plaintiff filed his complaint in federal court within the 
state statute of limitations but did not serve summons on the de-
fendant as required by the Kansas statute governing commence-
ment of actions until after the statute of limitations had run.75  Al-
though Federal Rule 3 purported to define how to commence an 
action in federal court, the Supreme Court held that Federal Rule 3 
did not govern the manner in which an action was filed in federal 
court for purposes of tolling the state statute of limitations.76  Rather, 
Kansas’ service statute controlled because it was an integral part of 
the state statute of limitations, and, under Guaranty Trust, the stat-
ute of limitations was part of the state-law cause of action.77 
This Comment focuses on the situation where a federal rule 
seems to apply.  In Hanna v. Plumer, the Court recognized that 
Erie’s two purposes were to discourage forum shopping and to 
 
 66. Act of June 19, 1934, Pub. L. No. 73-415, 48 Stat. 1064 (codified as 
amended at 28 U.S.C. §§ 2071–2077 (2000)). 
 67. See generally FED. R. CIV. P. 
 68. See id. 
 69. See Walker, 446 U.S. at 752–53. 
 70. 326 U.S. 99 (1945). 
 71. Id. at 109. 
 72. See id. 
 73. Byrd v. Blue Ridge Rural Elec. Coop., 356 U.S. 525, 537–38 (1958). 
 74. 337 U.S. 530 (1949). 
 75. Id. at 531. 
 76. Id. at 533–34. 
 77. Id. 
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avoid “inequitable administration of the laws”78 but concluded that 
when a Federal Rule of Civil Procedure apparently governs the 
situation, the outcome-determinative test is not appropriate.79  
Rather, if the federal rule “cover[s] the point in dispute,” federal 
courts are to apply it unless it exceeds the rulemaking authority of 
the Rules Enabling Act or other constitutional bounds.80  Hanna 
applies to situations where there is a direct conflict between the 
federal and local rules.81  Hanna’s method for determining conflict 
has been refined in subsequent cases. 
In Walker v. Armco Steel Corp.,82 the Supreme Court shifted 
away from Hanna’s federal rule-friendly imperative to a more 
state-law oriented approach.83  The Walker Court redefined the 
Hanna  “direct collision” rule, restating the inquiry as whether the 
federal rule is “sufficiently broad to control the issue before the 
Court,” though the precise meaning of this phrase is somewhat elu-
sive.84  Walker instructed lower courts to give the federal rule its 
“plain meaning” and not strain to avoid conflict with state rules.85  
It is unclear, however, how seriously the Walker Court took this 
admonition, because it then turned to an examination of what “the 
Rule was intended” to do, seeming to suggest a broader inquiry (as 
discussed below).86  In short, if the federal rule is broad enough to 
govern the situation, the Hanna inquiry into its validity must fol-
low.87  If the federal rule is not broad enough, it is simply inapplica-
ble, and the analysis turns to Erie’s goals—preventing forum shop-
ping and ensuring equitable administration of the laws—to deter-
mine whether state or federal rules apply.88 
In Walker, the Court characterized Oklahoma’s service of 
summons statute as “a statement of a substantive decision by that 
State that actual service on, and accordingly actual notice by, the 
defendant is an integral part of the several policies served by the 
statute of limitations” that “must be considered part and parcel of 
 
 78. Hanna v. Plumer, 380 U.S. 460, 468 n.9 (1965). 
 79. Id. at 468–70. 
 80. Id. at 470–71. 
 81. Id. at 470. 
 82. 446 U.S. 740 (1980). 
 83. See id. at 751–52 (holding service of process procedures were an integral 
part of state law and could not be preempted by the federal rule). 
 84. See id. at 749–50. 
 85. Id. at 750 n.9. 
 86. Id. at 750. 
 87. Id. at 749–50. 
 88. Id. at 752–53. 
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the statute of limitations”89—a substantive state law.  The Walker 
Court concluded that Federal “Rule 3 does not replace such policy 
determinations found in state law.”90  In other words, the Court 
made clear that, even when a federal rule appears to govern a pro-
cedural situation, a reviewing court must closely examine the rule’s 
intent before finding preemption.91 
Gasperini represents the Court’s most current precedent re-
solving a conflict between state and federal law in diversity cases 
and casts the Court’s willingness to give effect to substantive state 
policies even more starkly.92  As part of a tort reform measure, New 
York had imposed a higher standard of review for the size of jury 
awards.93  The application of these standards in diversity actions 
became important in Gasperini, in federal court through diversity 
jurisdiction, when the defendant contested the jury’s award of 
damages.94  The Gasperini Court characterized the new standard as 
both procedural, in that it assigned “decisionmaking authority to 
New York’s Appellate Division,” and substantive, in that it con-
trolled “how much a plaintiff can be awarded.”95  “The dispositive 
question, therefore, is whether federal courts can give effect to the 
substantive thrust of [the New York statute] without untoward al-
teration of the federal scheme for the trial and decision of civil 
cases.”96 
The Gasperini Court found both the state and federal interests 
could be accommodated.97  The federal concern at stake was the 
potential violation of the Re-examination Clause of the Seventh 
Amendment, which provides that “no fact tried by a jury, shall be 
otherwise re-examined in any Court of the United States, than ac-
cording to the rules of the common law.”98  The Re-examination 
Clause was implicated by the New York statute’s assignment of re-
viewing authority to the New York Appellate Division.99  The 
Court read the statute as instructing New York trial courts to apply 
the more stringent standard of review and concluded that the 
state’s substantive interest could be accommodated if federal dis-
 
 89. Id. at 751–52. 
 90. Id. at 752. 
 91. See id. 
 92. See Gasperini v. Ctr. for Humanities, Inc., 518 U.S. 415 (1996). 
 93. Id. at 423. 
 94. Id. at 420–22. 
 95. Id. at 426. 
 96. Id. (emphasis added). 
 97. Id. at 437. 
 98. U.S. CONST. amend. VII. 
 99. Gasperini, 518 U.S. at 431. 
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trict courts applied the same standard in diversity suits.100  The fed-
eral interest in preventing a reviewing court from an unconstitu-
tional re-examination of facts was accommodated by ignoring the 
section of the New York statute that instructed appellate courts to 
apply the same standard.101  The majority specifically rejected Jus-
tice Scalia’s contention that Federal Rule 59 left no room for the 
operation of the New York statute.102  Indeed, in the same footnote, 
the Court cited with approval a leading textbook’s observation that 
it “has continued since [Hanna] to interpret the federal rules to 
avoid conflict with important state regulatory policies.”103  More-
over, the Court noted that “[f]ederal courts have interpreted the 
Federal Rules . . . with sensitivity to important state interests and 
regulatory policies.”104 
Gasperini again altered Hanna’s “direct collision” analysis,  
reversing the never-vital “plain meaning” rule of Walker.105  In es-
sence, when considering if a Federal Rule of Civil Procedure ap-
plies in diversity actions, courts engage in a two-step analysis.  First, 
a court must ascertain the purposes and intended scopes of the 
Federal Rule and the state law.  Second, if no direct conflict exists, 
the court must determine whether the state law can be accommo-
dated without impairing the integrity of the federal system.106  This 
Comment is primarily concerned with the first step in this analysis. 
Having explored the intended scope and purpose of Alaska 
Rule 68 above, we next undertake the same inquiry with respect to 
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 68. 
B. The Purpose and Intent of Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 68 
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 68 would seem, on its face, to 
govern the effects of defendants’ offers of judgment in federal 
 
 100. Id. at 436–37. 
 101. Id. at 437. 
 102. Id. at 437 n.22. 
 103. Id. (quoting RICHARD H. FALLON, JR., DANIEL J. MELTZER & DAVID L. 
SHAPIRO, HART AND WESCHLER’S THE FEDERAL COURTS AND THE FEDERAL SYS-
TEM 729–30 (4th ed. 1996)). 
 104. Id. at 427 n.7. 
 105. See Richard D. Freer, Some Thoughts on the State of Erie After Gasperini, 
76 TEX. L. REV. 1637, 1643 (1998) (noting that “if the Court means what it says, it 
may have replaced the search for ‘plain meaning’ with a heightened sensitivity to 
potential impact on state policy”). 
 106. Cf. John C. McCoid, II, Hanna v. Plumer: The Erie Doctrine Changes 
Shape, 51 VA. L. REV. 884, 912 (1965) (“The policy of the Court, the mandate of 
Congress, and the command of the Constitution all require that state substance 
not be impaired in the absence of federal substantive competence.”). 
03__ROESCH.DOC 6/5/2006  4:00 PM 
2006] ERIE SIMILARITIES 95 
court.  Inspired in part by state offer of judgment rules,107 Federal 
Rule 68 provides, in relevant part, that: 
At any time more than 10 days before the trial begins, a party 
defending against a claim may serve upon the adverse party an 
offer to allow judgment to be taken against the defending party 
for the money or to the property or the effect specified in the of-
fer, with costs then accrued.  If within 10 days after the service of 
the offer the adverse party serves written notice that the offer is 
accepted, either party may then file the offer and notice of ac-
ceptance together with proof of service thereof and thereupon 
the clerk shall enter judgment.  An offer not accepted shall be 
deemed withdrawn and evidence thereof is not admissible except 
in a proceeding to determine costs.  If the judgment finally ob-
tained by the offeree is not more favorable than the offer, the of-
feree must pay the costs incurred after the making of the offer.  
The fact that an offer is made but not accepted does not preclude 
a subsequent offer.108 
Federal Rule 68 was promulgated under the REA, which pro-
vides that “[t]he Supreme Court shall have the power to prescribe 
general rules of practice and procedure . . . for cases in the United 
States district courts.”109  However, “[s]uch rules shall not abridge, 
enlarge or modify any substantive right.”110 
Rule 68 was intended to facilitate settlement of lawsuits and 
decrease litigation,111 and, like all of the Federal Rules of Civil Pro-
cedure, it was intended to provide a uniform procedure for cases in 
federal court.  Rule 68 accomplishes these goals by maintaining the 
status quo American Rule with respect to attorneys’ fees, although 
it provides for cost-shifting for successful offerors.112  The American 
Rule is the default rule in the federal system and among the states: 
“In the United States, the prevailing litigant is ordinarily not enti-
tled to collect a reasonable attorneys’ fee from the loser.”113  There-
fore, in the federal court system, if the statute defining the cause of 
action is silent as to attorneys’ fees, the prevailing party is not enti-
 
 107. See FED. R. CIV. P. 68 (Advisory Committee’s Note). 
 108. Id. 
 109. 28 U.S.C. § 2072(a) (2000). 
 110. § 2072(b). 
 111. See Marek v. Chesney, 473 U.S. 1, 5 (1985); Leslie S. Bonney et al., Rule 
68: Awakening a Sleeping Giant, 65 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 379, 379–80 (1997). 
 112. See MRO Commc’ns, Inc. v. AT&T Co., 197 F.3d 1276, 1281 (9th Cir. 
1999) (“The requirement under Rule 54(d)(2) of an independent source of author-
ity for an award of attorneys’ fees gives effect to the ‘American Rule’ that each 
party must bear its own attorneys’ fees in the absence of a rule, statute or contract 
authorizing such an award.”). 
 113. Alyeska Pipeline Serv. Co. v. Wilderness Soc’y, 421 U.S. 240, 247 (1975). 
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tled to an award.114  The history of the American Rule helps deter-
mine the intended scope of Federal Rule 68. 
Initially, Congress instructed the federal courts to apply the at-
torneys’ fee award practices of the state courts in the federal court’s 
district.115  As early as 1796, the Supreme Court “appear[ed] to have 
ruled that the Judiciary itself would not create a general rule, inde-
pendent of any statute, allowing awards of attorneys’ fees in federal 
courts.”116  In 1853, Congress standardized the practice of awarding 
attorneys’ fees in federal court, eliminating such awards in the ab-
sence of specific statutory authorization.117  This standardization 
was prompted in part by the wide diversity of the federal practice, 
which resulted in some losing litigants “being unfairly saddled with 
exorbitant fees.”118  This concern only makes sense when the ine-
quality is the result of the district in which a federal claim is filed.  
The purpose of federal diversity jurisdiction was to allow out-of-
state litigants to avoid prejudice while litigating in state court and 
not to allow them to avoid the application of substantive state law.  
Therefore, standardization was appropriate only for cases prosecut-
ing a federal claim.  Congress’s statute-by-statute approach to at-
torneys’ fee awards further indicates that it intended the 1853 Act 
to standardize federal question cases; Congress chose a method by 
which it could only delineate fee awards in cases governed by fed-
eral law. 
The 1853 Act was carried forward in the Revised Statutes of 
1874 and the Judicial Code of 1911.119  By the time the Federal 
Rules of Civil Procedure were adopted in 1938, federal statutes had 
defined and authorized cost awards to prevailing parties for more 
than eighty-five years.120  The Federal Rules were adopted against 
this background.  Federal Rule 54(d)(1) provides for an award of 
costs to the prevailing party as a matter of course.121  Generally, a 
 
 114. Marek, 473 U.S. at 7–8 (“By the time the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure 
were adopted in 1938, federal statutes had authorized and defined awards of costs 
to prevailing parties for more than 85 years.”); id. at 8 (noting that most excep-
tions to American Rule regarding attorneys’ fee awards “were found in federal 
statutes”). 
 115. Chap. XXI, § 2, 1 Stat. 93 (1789). 
 116. Alyeska Pipeline, 421 U.S. at 249 (citing Arcambel v. Wiseman, 3 U.S. (3 
Dall.) 306 (1796)). 
 117. See id. at 251–52. 
 118. Id. (citing remarks of Sen. Bradbury, CONG. GLOBE, 32d Cong., 2d Sess. 
207 (1853)). 
 119. Id. at 255 (footnotes omitted). 
 120. Marek v. Chesney, 473 U.S. 1, 7–8 (1985). 
 121. See FED. R. CIV. P. 54(d)(1). 
03__ROESCH.DOC 6/5/2006  4:00 PM 
2006] ERIE SIMILARITIES 97 
party who obtains judgment is considered the prevailing party122—
in other words, a plaintiff who succeeds on liability but obtains only 
nominal damages still prevails.  The practical effect of Rule 68’s 
award of costs to a defendant who makes a successful offer of 
judgment is to extend prevailing party status to such defendants, at 
least for purposes of awarding post-offer costs.  But costs, which 
include such items as copying fees and long distance telephone 
charges, are rather insignificant when compared to attorneys’ fees.  
Federal Rule 54(d)(2) provides an award of attorneys’ fees to the 
prevailing party only when the underlying cause of action allocates 
it.123  Federal Rule 54 does not create a substantive right to attor-
neys’ fees—an approach consistent with the REA’s prohibition of 
the creation or expansion of substantive rights (under the Federal 
Rules of Civil Procedure).124 
Similarly, Federal Rule 68 should be interpreted as complying 
with the REA; that is, as not expanding the right to attorneys’ fees 
beyond those rights provided in specific statutes.  In fact, Rule 68 
has been read even more restrictively.  In Marek v. Chesney, the 
Supreme Court interpreted Federal Rule 68 as authorizing an 
award of attorneys’ fees to defendants who make fee-inducing of-
fers only when the underlying cause of action provides for attor-
neys’ fees as part of “costs.”125  This holding was driven by a strict 
reading of Rule 68’s text in conjunction with relevant statutes.126  
Under Marek, attorneys’ fees may be awarded as part of the allow-
able “costs” under Rule 68 if the underlying statute provided for an 
award of attorneys’ fees as costs but not if it provided for an award 
of attorneys’ fees and costs.127  The text-based reading was criticized 
as unduly restricting congressional intent.128 
The result in Marek makes more sense when one considers the 
practical effect of applying Federal Rule 68 offers of judgment to 
attorneys’ fee awards.  As explained above, the practical effect is to 
declare the offeror the prevailing party for Rule 54(d)(1) purposes.  
The text-based rule, while sometimes arbitrary, reflects an under-
standing that extending prevailing party status for purposes of at-
torneys’ fees to defendants who made “fee-inducing” offers of 
judgment would create a new class of litigants who were entitled to 
 
 122. CHARLES ALAN WRIGHT, ARTHUR R. MILLER & MARY KAY KANE, 10 
FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE § 2667 (3d ed. 1998). 
 123. FED R. CIV. P. 54(d)(2)(A). 
 124. See 28 U.S.C. § 2072(b) (2000). 
 125. Marek, 473 U.S. at 9. 
 126. Id. 
 127. Id. at 23 (Brennan, J., dissenting). 
 128. Id. at 26. 
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attorneys’ fees (defendants with successful Rule 68 offers), while 
denying attorneys’ fees to plaintiffs who, by virtue of their recov-
ery, would otherwise be entitled to such fees.  Without congres-
sional guidance, this redefinition of prevailing party status for at-
torneys’ fees is inappropriate.129  Moreover, there is no indication 
that Rule 68 actually sought to redefine “prevailing party status.”130  
The fact that Federal Rule 68 as a practical matter redefines “pre-
vailing party status” with regard to costs does not indicate intent to 
change the congressionally prescribed balance struck in statutes 
which allow for awards of attorneys’ fees.  The Marek Court there-
fore enunciated a rule applying Federal Rule 68 to attorneys’ fee 
awards only when the textual pull is irresistible. 
Since the REA forbids creation or extension of substantive 
rights, Federal Rule 68 is best read as avoiding the creation of a 
right to attorneys’ fees for parties making a successful offer of 
judgment by restricting the scope of rights to attorneys’ fees for 
causes of action that already provided for such recovery.  In other 
words, by not providing for an award of attorneys’ fees, Federal 
Rule 68 was merely complying with a statutory directive not to ex-
pand substantive rights.131  Such a reading is consistent with the Su-
preme Court’s emphatic deferral to Congress in Alyeska Pipeline to 
create new rights to attorneys’ fees as exceptions to the American 
Rule.132 
 
 129. See Alyeska Pipeline Serv. Co. v. Wilderness Soc’y, 421 U.S. 240, 262 
(1975) (stating “it is apparent that the circumstances under which attorneys’ fees 
are to be awarded and the range of discretion of the courts in making those awards 
are matters for Congress to determine”). 
 130. Marek, 473 U.S. at 5, 11 (noting that the “plain purpose of Rule 68 is to 
encourage settlement and avoid litigation” while also recognizing that a plaintiff 
against whom a successful offer of judgment was made was “technically the pre-
vailing party” when it recovered at trial). 
 131. See Alyeska Pipeline, 421 U.S. at 247 (noting “[i]n the United States, the 
prevailing litigant is ordinarily not entitled to collect a reasonable attorneys’ fee 
from the loser” and stating that “it would be inappropriate for the Judiciary, with-
out legislative guidance, to reallocate the burdens of litigation” in declining to 
adopt “private attorney general” exception to American Rule); MRO Commc’ns, 
Inc., v. AT&T Co., 197 F.3d 1276, 1281 (9th Cir. 1999). 
 132. See Alyeska Pipeline, 421 U.S. at 262 (stating that “it is apparent that the 
circumstances under which attorneys’ fees are to be awarded and the range of 
discretion of the courts in making those awards are matters for Congress to de-
termine”); id. at 263 (noting that congressional exceptions to the American Rule 
“can in no sense be construed as a grant of authority to the Judiciary to jettison 
the traditional rule against nonstatutory allowances to the prevailing party”); id. at 
269 (noting that “courts are not free to fashion drastic new rules with respect to 
the allowance of attorneys’ fees to the prevailing party”). 
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In sum, Federal Rule 68 is not intended to foreclose an award 
of attorneys’ fees based on a successful offer of judgment when the 
underlying law contemplates prevailing party status for a defendant 
who makes a successful offer of judgment.  Instead, Federal Rule 
68 is simply cautious not to expand prevailing party status, with the 
attendant consequences for attorneys’ fees, without authorization 
from the underlying law. 
C. An Erie-Hanna Analysis of Alaska Civil Rule 68 and Federal 
Rule 68 
This Comment now evaluates whether Alaska Rule 68 governs 
in federal diversity actions arising under Alaska law.  This inquiry 
involves two questions.  First, does Federal Rule 68 preempt 
Alaska Rule 68 due to a “direct collision”?  Second, if Federal Rule 
68 does not preempt Alaska Rule 68, does any federal policy or 
decisional rule provide a sufficient reason for the non-application 
of Alaska Rule 68 in diversity cases?  This Comment answers both 
questions in the negative. 
1. There Is No “Direct Collision” Between Alaska Civil Rule 
68 and Federal Rule 68.  As described above, when a Federal Rule 
of Civil Procedure appears to govern in a diversity case, the court 
must determine whether there is a “direct collision” between the 
federal rule and potentially applicable state law.  Because Alaska 
Rule 68 and Federal Rule 68 share nearly identical text, they would 
appear to be in “direct collision” under Hanna.  But as modified by 
Walker and Gasperini, the inquiry into whether the Federal Rule 
governs must delve deeper—examining the intended scope and 
purpose of each rule. 
When the American Rule is not the background structure for 
awarding attorneys’ fees under state law, the assumption underly-
ing Federal Rule 68’s preservation of the status quo does not 
hold.133  In Alaska, where costs and attorneys’ fees are awarded to 
prevailing parties as a matter of course, offers of judgment operate 
in an entirely different manner.  Applying Federal Rule 68 to deny 
a party attorneys’ fees pursuant to an offer of judgment in such cir-
cumstances may run afoul of the REA’s admonition that the Fed-
eral Rules should not abrogate substantive rights.134 
 
 133. Cf. id. at 262 (holding that “[u]nder this scheme of things, it is apparent 
that the circumstances under which attorneys’ fees are to be awarded . . . are mat-
ters for Congress to determine” (emphasis added)). 
 134. See 28 U.S.C. § 2072(b) (2000). 
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Alaska Rule 68 serves at least one purpose for which Federal 
Rule 68 was not intended: Alaska Rule 68 provides parties with an 
additional avenue to become the “prevailing party” for purposes of 
Alaska Rule 82.  As examination of its interaction with Federal 
Rule 54 demonstrates, Federal Rule 68 was never intended to de-
termine prevailing party status for the purposes of awarding attor-
neys’ fees.135 
Because Alaska Rule 68 confers prevailing party status on suc-
cessful Rule 68 defendants in precisely this manner,136 an award of 
attorneys’ fees does not implicate Federal Rule 68’s underlying 
purposes.137  A holding that Federal Rule 68 dictates the only con-
sequence of a defendant’s successful offer of judgment would 
eliminate one key method of obtaining attorneys’ fees under 
Alaska law, while ignoring Federal Rule 68’s intended purpose. 
Defendants would be most affected by such a change.  Alaska 
Rule 68 allows defendants who made a successful offer both (1) to 
avoid paying attorneys’ fees to a plaintiff who received a lesser re-
covery (and had to prevail on at least one—probably the main—
issue in order to do so), and (2) to recover their own attorneys’ 
fees.138  It is important to note, however, that plaintiffs who made 
fee-inducing offers are likely to have prevailed on the main issue 
anyway, or they would not have received the favorable judgment.  
Under Alaska law, a party who receives an affirmative recovery is 
the prevailing party unless the recovery was either de minimis or 
incidental to the main issue.139  Plaintiffs therefore have less need to 
use Alaska Rule 68’s alternate means of attaining prevailing party 
status than do defendants. 
2. Alaska Civil Rule 68 Must Be Applied in the Absence of 
Conflict with Federal Rule 68.  Once it becomes clear that defen-
dants may establish prevailing party status through successful 
Alaska Rule 68 offers of judgment in federal diversity actions, ap-
plication of the measure of attorneys’ fees follows.  Alaska Rule 82 
 
 135. See Marek, 473 U.S. at 11 (characterizing hypothetical plaintiff who re-
jected more favorable offer as “technically the prevailing party”). 
136.See ALASKA R. CIV. P. 68. 
 137. See, e.g., Burlington N. R.R. v. Woods, 480 U.S. 1, 7 (1987) (holding that 
“the purposes underlying the [applicable Federal] Rule are sufficiently coexten-
sive with the asserted purposes of the [state] statute to indicate that the Rule oc-
cupies the statute’s field of operation so as to preclude its application in federal 
diversity actions”). 
138. See ALASKA R. CIV. P. 68. 
 139. See Hutchins v. Schwartz, 724 P.2d 1194, 1204 (Alaska 1986); Owen Jones 
& Sons, Inc. v. C.R. Lewis Co., 497 P.2d 312, 313–14 (Alaska 1972). 
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does not provide the appropriate schedule of attorneys’ fees for 
litigants who become prevailing parties through fee-inducing 
Alaska Rule 68 offers of judgment.  Instead, the court must look to 
the only appropriate source to determine the proper amount of at-
torneys’ fees—Alaska Rule 68. 
Because Federal Rule 68 is not broad enough to govern under 
Walker and Gasperini, the analysis turns to whether to apply state 
or federal decisional law.  There is some dispute about whether this 
determination is to be made with reference to “the policies behind 
Erie and Ragan”140 or the balancing test in Byrd.141  This Comment 
is not focused on that controversy, so it will consider both of these 
methods, each of which yields the same result. 
a. Application of Alaska Civil Rule 68 Is Consistent with 
the “Twin Policies” of Erie.  The “twin policies” of Erie dictate that 
the substance of Alaska Rule 68 be applied.  Non-application of 
Alaska Rule 68 would result in forum shopping.142  The incentive 
that drives forum shopping in this context is subtle.  In each case, 
an Alaska Rule 68 offer will be more advantageous to one party or 
the other (often, the party with the stronger case will be able to 
leverage a favorable settlement with the latent threat of attorneys’ 
fees).  If Alaska Rule 68 were inapplicable in diversity cases, all 
parties except in-state defendants would have the opportunity to 
evaluate the relative strengths and weaknesses of their cases and 
could avoid the perils of Rule 68 by filing in or removing to federal 
court.  The same principle applies if Alaska Rule 68 is only partially 
applicable, as some decisions dealing with other states’ offer of 
judgment statutes have suggested—the calculations that litigants 
must perform in order to determine which forum is advantageous 
are simply more complicated.  But because partial application of 
state offer of judgment rules tends to focus on the coverage of Fed-
eral Rule 68, when the defendant’s offer exceeds the plaintiff’s re-
covery,143 partial application of Alaska Rule 68 would entirely de-
prive defendants of their alternate method of establishing prevail-
ing party status.  Therefore, although Alaska Rule 68 is a powerful 
 
 140. Walker v. Armco Steel Corp., 446 U.S. 740, 752 (1980). 
 141. Thomas D. Rowe, Jr., Not Bad for Government Work: Does Anyone Else 
Think the Supreme Court Is Doing a Halfway Decent Job in its Erie-Hanna Juris-
prudence?, 73 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 963, 965 (1998). 
 142. See Erie R.R. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64, 75–76 (1938). 
 143. See MRO Commc’ns, Inc. v. AT&T Co., 197 F.3d 1276, 1280 (9th Cir. 
1999) (holding Federal Rule 68 inapplicable and instead applying state offer of 
judgment statute because plaintiff received no recovery). 
03__ROESCH.DOC 6/5/2006  4:00 PM 
102 ALASKA LAW REVIEW [23:81 
weapon for defendants, its benefits mostly accrue to parties with 
stronger cases.144 
Non-application of Alaska Rule 68 would also result in an in-
equitable application of the law.145  An in-state defendant “sued by 
a non-resident . . . is entitled to invoke the protection available to 
him if the case had been brought in state court.”146  Even pre-Erie 
cases recognized that the inapplicability of substantive state rights 
to attorneys’ fees in federal diversity cases would manifest an injus-
tice: 
[I]t is clear that it is the policy of the state to allow plaintiffs to 
recover an attorney’s fee in certain cases, and it has made that 
policy effective by making the allowance of the fee mandatory 
on its courts in those cases.  It would be at least anomalous if this 
policy could be thwarted and the right so plainly given destroyed 
by removal of the cause to the federal courts.147 
Moreover, application of Alaska Rule 68 in federal diversity 
actions would not harm the integrity of the federal process.148  
Alaska Rule 68 and Federal Rule 68 serve a common stated goal of 
encouraging settlement and avoiding protracted litigation.  In fact, 
Alaska Rule 68 may be even more effective in promoting settle-
ments than Federal Rule 68.149  Application of Alaska Rule 68 
would also reduce litigation in the federal courts by eliminating any 
incentive to file in or remove to federal court in an attempt to avoid 
the rule.150  Moreover, Alaska Rule 68 is not difficult to administer 
in most cases: after determining whether attorneys’ fees are “rea-
sonable,” it is a matter of looking at a calendar and then perform-
ing simple arithmetic.151  In short, the policies underlying the Erie 
doctrine militate in favor of applying Alaska Rule 68 in diversity 
actions. 
 
 144. Or in some instances, the benefiting party is the one with the deeper pock-
ets and greater ability to pay attorneys’ fees in the event of a loss. 
 145. See Erie, 304 U.S. at 75. 
 146. Tanker Mgmt. v. Brunson, 918 F.2d 1524, 1529 (11th Cir. 1990). 
 147. Sioux County v. Nat’l Sur. Co., 276 U.S. 238, 243 (1928). 
 148. See Gasperini v. Ctr. for Humanities, Inc., 518 U.S. 415, 426 (1996). 
 149. See Cynthia L. Street, Comment, Rule 68: Erie Go Again—Costs, Attor-
neys’ Fees, and Plaintiffs’ Offers—Substance or Procedure, 20 MISS. C. L. REV. 341, 
354 (2000). 
 150. Id. 
 151. Alaska Civil Rule 68 provides for decreasing percentages of reasonable 
attorneys’ fees, depending on the amount of time that had elapsed between the 
date established for initial disclosures and the date upon which the offer was 
served.  ALASKA R. CIV. P. 68(b)(1–3). 
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b. Byrd Balancing Indicates that Application of Alaska 
Civil Rule 68 Is Appropriate.  A balancing of state and federal in-
terests under Byrd yields the same result.152  The state interest in 
the application of its offer of judgment rule is strong.  Alaska Rule 
68 serves not only to reduce and expedite litigation but also to de-
termine prevailing party status for attorneys’ fees purposes.  This 
litigation-reducing effect benefits both the court where the litiga-
tion is pending and the entire state of Alaska.  The social costs of 
excessive litigation justify efforts to curb such litigation, including 
the substantive rights of reduced statutes of limitations and in-
creased fee-shifting. 
In contrast, the federal interest in limiting the consequences of 
fee-inducing offers to those set out in Federal Rule 68 is negligible.  
Federal Rule 68 may not be the most effective means by which of-
fers of judgment could serve the Rule’s stated purpose.153  As noted 
above, state offer of judgment rules like Alaska’s may be even 
more effective in advancing Federal Rule 68’s purpose than the 
Federal Rule itself.154  Although it is unclear after Gasperini what 
sort of federal interest might outweigh a state substantive inter-
est,155 the federal interest here (in applying an arguably less effec-
tive settlement-inducing rule) does not seem to qualify. 
3. The Remaining Application of Federal Rule 68 Is Diversity 
Cases.  Finally, both Walker and Gasperini left room for the opera-
tion of the federal rule or constitutional principle at issue.  In 
Walker, Federal Rule 3 was held to govern the running of other 
procedural deadlines such as periods to answer.156  In Gasperini, the 
Re-examination Clause of the Seventh Amendment was held to 
govern the standard of review of the district court’s application of 
the New York state standard.157  This indicates that Federal Rule 68 
 
 152. See Byrd v. Blue Ridge Rural Elec. Coop., 356 U.S. 525, 538 (1958). 
 153. See generally Bonney et al., supra note 111, at 414–30 (examining several 
proposals for revising the rule). 
 154. See Street, supra note 149, at 354. 
 155. See Rowe, supra note 141, at 1011 (“[T]he initial difficulty [is] deciding 
whether a federal interest sufficient to trigger the Byrd-Gasperini [balancing] 
analysis [exists].”). Professor Rowe counsels “strong hesitancy” in finding federal 
interests sufficient to supplant state substantive rights and refers to Professor Re-
dish’s assertion that the only federal interest sufficient “to outbalance a truly sig-
nificant competing state interest [is] that of avoiding significant cost or inconven-
ience to the federal courts that would accompany the application of a particular 
state procedural rule.”  Id. (quoting MARTIN H. REDISH, FEDERAL JURISDICTION: 
TENSIONS IN THE ALLOCATION OF JUDICIAL POWER 239 (2d ed. 1990)). 
 156. Walker v. Armco Steel Corp., 446 U.S. 740, 751 (1980). 
 157. Gasperini v. Ctr. for Humanities, Inc., 518 U.S. 415, 438 (1996). 
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should not be left bereft of all operation by the application of 
Alaska Rule 68 in federal diversity cases.  Gasperini suggests how 
this may be done—the Court applied substantive state law (the 
standard of review for excessive jury verdicts) while following fed-
eral procedure (the trial court’s decision using the New York stan-
dard is reviewed for abuse of discretion on appeal).158 
Although the substantive consequences of the offer of judg-
ment and the determination of which parties can extend such offers 
should govern,159 it can be inferred that Federal Rule 68 should con-
trol the manner in which offers are made and accepted.160  The dis-
trict court has a legitimate interest in establishing a uniform 
method for evaluating the timing of when an offer has been made, 
even if the state substantive right controls the consequences of fee-
inducing offers.  Thus, the court may insist offers be made pursuant 
to the procedures of Federal Rule 68.  Like the operation of Fed-
eral Rule 3 in Walker, the application of Federal Rule 68 will pro-
vide for efficient operation of the federal courts. 
Of course, Federal Rule 68 and Alaska Rule 68 specify similar 
procedures for making, accepting, and recording offers.  Both re-
quire that the offer be made by serving written notice on the ad-
verse party; that the adverse party accept the offer in writing within 
ten days; that the adverse party serve written notice on the offeror; 
that the offer will expire after ten days if it is not accepted; and that 
either party may record the offer and acceptance with the court.161  
However, Alaska Rule 68(a) provides that an offer of judgment 
may not be rescinded within the ten-day period, whereas Federal 
Rule 68 is silent on that point.  Because rescission is an aspect of 
whether the offer was made and accepted rather than a conse-
quence of an unaccepted offer, it appears to be a procedural aspect 
of the offer of judgment law.  Federal law arguably should govern.  
Case law interpreting Federal Rule 68 would therefore determine 
the effect of rescission on the offeror’s right to recover under the 
substantive portion of Alaska Rule 68. 
 
 158. Id. at 437–38. 
 159. Id. at 437. 
 160. See id.; Walker, 466 U.S. at 750–51; MRO Commc’ns, Inc. v. AT&T Co., 
197 F.3d 1276, 1282 (9th Cir. 1999)(“The only procedure for notifying a plaintiff of 
an offer of judgment in federal court is set forth in Federal Rule 68.”). 
 161. Compare FED. R. CIV. P. 68 with ALASKA R. CIV. P. 68(a). 
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D. Implications for the Proper Scope of the Inquiry into Whether 
the Federal Rule Is Broad Enough to Govern 
As we have seen, determining whether the federal rule applies 
requires an inquiry into the scope and purpose of both the federal 
and state rules.  In Walker and Ragan, the Court concluded without 
much discussion that there was no evidence that the federal rule 
was intended to serve the same purpose as the state rule regarding 
tolling.162  But the Gasperini Court conducted a much more lengthy 
analysis of the New York standard of review for jury verdict exces-
siveness and the Seventh Amendment’s Re-examination Clause. 
In Gasperini, both the substantive right and the procedure for 
enforcing that right deviated from the federal model.163  In contrast, 
in comparing Federal Rule 68 and analogous state offer of judg-
ment provisions, the court must determine which law governs the 
consequences for what is a substantially similar procedure.  The 
question is whether, by specifying one set of consequences for de-
fendants’ offers of judgment, Federal Rule 68 intended to preclude 
other consequences based on state law. 
Practice has shown that the answer cannot be based on a 
“plain meaning” of Federal Rule 68’s text.  Federal Rule 68’s in-
tended scope and purpose can only be understood properly with 
reference to the Rules Enabling Act, Federal Rule 54, the underly-
ing federal costs statute and its history, and case law interpreting 
Federal Rules 68 and 54.  Moreover, the inquiry is still incomplete 
absent an understanding of the state rule purportedly preempted 
by the federal rule.  Alaska Rule 68 cannot be properly understood 
without reference to Alaska Rule 82, prior versions of Alaska 
Rules 68 and 82, as well as case law interpreting both.  These in-
quiries reveal fundamental differences in the underlying substan-
tive rights in the Alaska and federal legal systems. 
As explained above, these inquiries reveal that the conse-
quences for fee-inducing offers of judgment specified in Federal 
Rule 68 are predicated on an assumption that is incorrect in cases 
governed by Alaska law.  Because Federal Rule 68 was not in-
tended to affect prevailing party status for attorneys’ fees purposes 
but to maintain the status quo with regard to attorneys’ fees, its 
consequences cannot govern when the status quo differs from the 
underlying assumption.  Federal Rule 68 is not broad enough to 
control “fee-inducing” offers of judgment in federal diversity suits 
governed by Alaska substantive law.  Ultimately, where no Federal 
 
 162. Walker, 446 U.S. at 750–51; Ragan v. Merch. Transfer & Warehouse Co., 
337 U.S. 530, 533–34 (1949). 
 163. Gasperini v. Ctr. for Humanities, Inc., 518 U.S. 415, 426–39 (1996). 
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Rule of Civil Procedure affirmatively precludes a consequence 
specified by substantive state law, it is not broad enough to govern 
under Walker and Gasperini.  State law should be applied. 
Differences in background assumptions have several conse-
quences for the Erie-Hanna analysis.  First, awareness of such dif-
ferences should signal the need for a thorough inquiry into the pur-
pose and intended scope of each rule.  When the assumptions dif-
fer, textually similar rules might apply differently to different situa-
tions.  Second, a significant dissimilarity in the assumptions under-
lying each rule will rarely lead to a direct collision between them.  
This, in turn, points to a further need for rigorous inquiry into the 
intended scope and purpose of each rule every time an apparent 
conflict is presented.  Even though the “direct collision” analysis 
appears to be among the least problematic steps in the Erie-Hanna 
framework, lower courts have fallen short of the ideal in their Fed-
eral Rule 68 and Erie-Hanna jurisprudence. 
IV.  THE USE AND ABUSE OF “DIRECT COLLISIONS”: VARIOUS 
STATE OFFER OF JUDGMENT STATUTES IN THE FEDERAL COURTS 
A. The Three Approaches to Potential Collisions Between Fed-
eral Rule 68 and State Offer of Judgment Statutes 
Cases from around the nation have dealt with the application 
of state rules awarding attorneys’ fees or other additional costs 
based on the rejection of a favorable offer of judgment.  These 
cases have taken several differing approaches to the application of 
state rules facially similar to Alaska Rule 68.  One approach applies 
a similar state statute in full.  A second method carefully evades 
conflict by limiting the holding.  A third method involves a federal-
state hybrid in which the state offer of judgment is inapplicable, but 
only for attorneys’ fees purposes. 
The Eleventh Circuit has adopted the first approach.  In 
Tanker Management, Inc. v. Brunson,164 the court considered 
whether to apply a Florida statute authorizing the recovery of at-
torneys’ fees by a prevailing defendant if the plaintiff unreasonably 
rejected either a settlement offer or an offer of judgment.165  The 
court concluded that Federal Rule 68 was not in “direct collision” 
with the Florida statute because “Rule 68 concerns only interest 
and offers of judgment, while the Florida statute concerns attor-
ney’s fees, offers of judgment and settlement offers.”166  However, 
 
 164. 918 F.2d 1524 (11th Cir. 1990). 
 165. Id. at 1528. 
 166. Id. 
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because even the Supreme Court speaks of Federal Rule 68 offers 
as “settlement” offers,167 this reasoning is not entirely persuasive. 
On a deeper level, the court’s decision reflects its understanding 
that holding the Florida statute inapplicable would result in forum 
shopping by out-of-state plaintiffs, and thus it does not hinge on the 
distinction between settlement offers and offers of judgment.168 
The Ninth and Seventh Circuits have adopted the second ap-
proach, finding no “direct collision” on the facts of specific cases.  
In MRO Communications, Inc. v. AT&T Co.,169 the Ninth Circuit 
noted that Federal Rule 68 is inapplicable in determining whether a 
defendant who makes an offer of judgment and then obtains judg-
ment is entitled to attorneys’ fees on the basis of its offer of judg-
ment.170  Because Federal Rule 68 was inapplicable, there could be 
no direct collision with the Nevada offer of judgment law.  The 
court then applied the equitable principles of Erie and upheld the 
award of attorneys’ fees under a state offer of judgment law.171  Be-
cause Federal Rule 68 does not specifically address plaintiffs’ offers 
of judgment, the same logic dictates a holding that Federal Rule 68 
is inapplicable to plaintiffs’ offers of judgment.172 
The Seventh Circuit has also taken the second approach, care-
fully limiting its holding to find no direct conflict on the facts in 
specific cases.  In S.A. Healy Co. v. Milwaukee Metropolitan Sewage 
District, the Seventh Circuit considered whether a Wisconsin stat-
ute, which authorized plaintiffs to recover double costs and an in-
creased interest rate when the defendant turned down a favorable 
settlement demand, should be applied in a federal diversity case.173  
The court found “no direct conflict between the Wisconsin rule 
concerning plaintiffs’ settlement demands and any rule of federal 
 
 167. See Marek v. Chesny, 473 U.S. 1, 10 (1985) (referring to “the offers of set-
tlement encouraged by [Federal] Rule 68”). 
 168. Tanker Mgmt., 918 F.2d at 1529 (holding that an in-state defendant “sued 
by a non-resident . . . is entitled to invoke the protection available to him if the 
case had been brought in state court”). 
 169. 197 F.3d 1276 (9th Cir. 1999). 
 170. Id. at 1280.  Federal Rule 68 authorizes an award of costs on the basis of a 
successful offer of judgment only when the plaintiff receives some recovery.  
When the plaintiff receives nothing, Federal Rule 54 governs the award of costs to 
the defendant.  See Delta Air Lines, Inc. v. August, 450 U.S. 346, 350–51 (1981). 
 171. MRO Commc’ns, 197 F.3d at 1282–83.  Although the MRO Communica-
tions court quoted a case citing Hanna, in light of its earlier determination that 
Federal Rule 68 was not implicated, it does not appear the court engaged in a fa-
cial “direct collision” analysis on the narrow facts of the case. 
 172. See S.A. Healy Co. v. Milwaukee Metro. Sewage Dist., 60 F.3d 305, 310 
(7th Cir. 1995). 
 173. Id. at 307. 
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procedure . . . [because Federal Rule 68] is limited to offers by de-
fendants.”174  The Healy court therefore declined to find in Federal 
Rule 68 a negative preclusion of plaintiffs’ offers of judgment.175  It 
determined that a rejection of the Wisconsin rule in federal diver-
sity cases would likely result in forum shopping by plaintiffs, while 
its application would likely not impair the integrity of federal pro-
cedures.176  However, the court noted that “[t]he situation would be 
different if the case involved defendants’ offers of settlement, be-
cause then we would have a state rule and a federal rule covering 
the identical issue.”177  This dictum implicitly rejects the thin distinc-
tion between offers of judgment and settlement offers. 
In Healy, the Seventh Circuit observed that federal courts in 
diversity cases ought not “jigger” procedural rules to alter the bal-
ance struck by the state between plaintiffs and defendants.178  Be-
cause the Wisconsin rule governing defendants’ settlement offers 
are substantively identical to Federal Rule 68, simultaneous appli-
cation of the Wisconsin rule regarding plaintiffs’ settlement offers 
and Federal Rule 68 did not alter Wisconsin’s balance.179  But in 
other states (including Alaska), application of state rules governing 
plaintiffs’ offers of judgment without corresponding application of 
the state rules governing defendants’ offers of judgment would up-
set the state’s chosen balance.  Although the Healy court was able 
to maintain Wisconsin’s balance, this dictum was probably ill-
founded with respect to offer of judgment statutes that are not 
identical in consequence to Federal Rule 68. 
Four years before MRO Communications, the United States 
District Court for the District of Nevada adopted the third ap-
proach—creating a “hybrid” right—in Nicolaus v. West Side Trans-
port, Inc.180  Nevada Rule of Civil Procedure 68 allows a successful 
offeree to recover attorneys’ fees as a matter of course.181  The 
court found that defendants in federal diversity cases would be re-
quired to make offers of judgment under Federal Rule 68 rather 
than Nevada Rule 68.182  To discourage forum shopping by plain-
tiffs, the court decided that attorneys’ fees were not recoverable by 
 
 174. Id. at 310. 
 175. Id. at 312. 
 176. Id. at 310–11. 
 177. Id. at 311. 
 178. Id. at 312. 
 179. Id. 
 180. 185 F.R.D. 608 (D. Nev. 1999). 
 181. Id. at 614. 
 182. Id. at 613–14 (citing Gil de Rebollo v. Miami Heat Ass’ns, 137 F.3d 56, 66 
(1st Cir. 1998); Aceves v. Allstate Ins. Co., 68 F.3d 1160, 1168 (9th Cir. 1995)). 
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either party under Nevada Rule 68 in diversity actions in federal 
court.183  However, the Nicolaus court held that the plaintiff, as well 
as the defendant, may recover costs incurred after a successful offer 
of judgment in Nevada.184  Because prevailing parties are generally 
allowed to recover costs in federal court whether or not they make 
a successful offer of judgment,185 it is unclear what benefit the plain-
tiff receives from this hybrid application of the Nevada rule. 
The Nicolaus court’s conclusion that defendants must make 
their offers of judgment under Federal Rule 68 rather than under 
Nevada Rule 68, supported by no analysis of its own, seems based 
on another court’s conclusory statement and an inaccurate cita-
tion.186  Moreover, the Nicolaus court did not conduct an inquiry 
into whether the Nevada rule was substantive and whether Ne-
vada’s substantive interest, if any, could be accommodated in the 
federal system.187 
For the reasons above, MRO Communications effectively dis-
approved of the reasoning in Nicolaus,188 yet the issue lived on in 
Walsh v. Kelly.189  In Walsh, the court acknowledged that the Ne-
vada offer of judgment statute was substantive but found it con-
flicted with Federal Rule 68.190  It reached this conclusion in part by 
 
 183. Nicolaus, 185 F.R.D. at 614.  In Gil de Rebollo, the court found a direct 
conflict between Federal Rule 68 and a Puerto Rico rule allowing recovery of at-
torneys’ fees following a successful offer of judgment.  137 F.3d at 66–67.  How-
ever, the court’s conclusion that Federal Rule 68 governed was supported by vir-
tually no analysis, especially of the purposes underlying the two rules.  Moreover, 
the Nicolaus court’s citation to Aceves does not support its conclusion.  The Nico-
laus court cited Aceves for the Aceves court’s description of Tanker Management, 
not Aceves’s holding.  185 F.R.D. at 613.  The Aceves opinion, in turn, cited 
Tanker Management for the proposition that the Florida statute at issue was in 
“direct conflict” with Federal Rule 68 because “the state rule made attorneys fees 
[incurred after a successful offer of judgment] compensable.”  68 F.3d at 1168 (cit-
ing Tanker Mgmt. v. Brunson, 918 F.2d 1524, 1528 (11th Cir. 1990)).  But the 
Tanker Management court held that “[Federal] Rule 68 is not in ‘direct collision’ 
with the portion of [the Florida statute] applicable in this case” to support the 
post-offer of judgment attorneys’ fee award.  918 F.2d at 1528 (emphasis added). 
Apparently, Aceves cited Tanker Management for a position diametrically op-
posed to the case’s actual meaning. 
 184. Nicolaus, 185 F.R.D. at 614. 
 185. FED. R. CIV. P. 54. 
 186. See argument supra note 183. 
 187. See Nicolaus, 185 F.R.D. 608. 
 188. MRO Commc’ns, Inc. v. AT&T Co., 197 F.3d 1276, 1280 (9th Cir. 1999). 
 189. 203 F.R.D. 597 (D. Nev. 2001). 
 190. Id. at 600. 
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characterizing “the point in dispute” as “offer of judgment rules.”191  
Although the Walsh court noted that state laws awarding attorneys’ 
fees “usually” do not conflict with the federal rules, it conducted no 
in-depth analysis of the intentions behind Federal Rule 68 and the 
state statute.  Rather, it found, “even though Nevada state law gov-
erns the award of attorney’s fees, there is no statute that applies in 
this case which is not in conflict with a federal law.”192 
Does understanding that the non-inclusion of attorneys’ fees in 
Federal Rule 68 was not intended to foreclose a substantive right to 
attorneys’ fees—but merely to avoid creating a substantive right 
where none existed before—change Federal Rule 68’s relationship 
with other states’ offer of judgment statutes?  Each state’s rule 
must be examined individually to determine its purpose and in-
tended reach, and such a survey is beyond this Comment’s scope.  
But a few observations are in order.  First, Alaska’s fee-shifting 
scheme is unusual in the American legal system.  Attribution of 
Alaska Rule 68’s purpose and range to other states’ offer of judg-
ment statutes (and vice versa) is therefore inappropriate.  Second, 
because other states’ offer of judgment statutes do not share 
Alaska Rule 68’s role in determining prevailing party status, it is 
more likely that their objectives overlap more substantially with 
Federal Rule 68’s purpose of encouraging settlements.  Neverthe-
less, the federal courts’ experience with these statutes, together 
with the lessons learned from the lack of a “direct collision” be-
tween the facially similar Alaska and federal rules, yields several 
important lessons for the “direct collision” aspect of the Erie-
Hanna analysis. 
B. Implications for the Erie-Hanna Analysis 
So far, the federal courts have failed to engage in a searching 
inquiry into the purpose and intended scope of Federal Rule 68 
when determining whether it displaces state offer of judgment rules 
under Hanna.193  Because Healy and Tanker Management were de-
cided before Gasperini clarified that the federal courts are to do as 
the Walker court did (inquire into the purpose and intended scope 
of the Rules) rather than what Walker said (adhere to the Rules’ 
“plain meaning”), they cannot be blamed for this omission.  But 
subsequent cases have not acknowledged the change in “direct col-
 
 191. Id. 
 192. Id. 
 193. Cf. Floyd, supra note 62, at 303 (criticizing the Gasperini court for paying 
too little attention to what made New York’s material deviation standard a sub-
stantive right). 
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lision” analysis effected by Gasperini.  Courts failing to conduct a 
thorough inquiry risk making three potential analytical errors. 
1. The “Piecemeal” Approach.  Federal courts presented with 
Erie problems involving state offer of judgment statutes often ap-
proach the issue in a “piecemeal” fashion, concluding that there is 
no direct collision because Federal Rule 68 does not mention plain-
tiffs’ offers of judgment194 or provide for costs when the defendant 
receives judgment.195  This approach has been endorsed by at least 
one commentator,196 because it allows a court to resolve the issue 
on apparently narrow and seemingly tidy grounds.  Moreover, it 
allows the court to ground its ruling firmly in the text of Federal 
Rule 68. 
The “piecemeal” approach is seemingly encouraged by 
Hanna’s holding that the federal rule governs when there is a “di-
rect collision.”197  As long as there is a textual difference between 
the two rules, the court can often find areas where the overlap is 
not complete.  Superficially, this is a very appealing approach.198  
But as an examination of Healy revealed, this may lead to inequi-
table results when the state’s “balance” between the rights of plain-
tiffs and defendants would be altered by application of the state’s 
rule in some circumstances and the federal rule in others.199 
Moreover, the piecemeal approach allows the court to decide 
the issue without formulating a coherent approach to the state and 
federal rules.  As a result, these precedents will be of little use 
when the rules seem to collide and Walker and Gasperini require 
inquiry into the rules’ purposes and scopes.200  More than being un-
helpful, the piecemeal cases may discourage a court in a subsequent 
case from a detailed analysis by suggesting that either the lack of 
textual differences ends the inquiry or that the previous court con-
ducted a comparison of the state and federal rules and implicitly 
 
 194. S.A. Healy Co. v. Milwaukee Metro. Sewage Dist., 60 F.3d 305, 310 (7th 
Cir. 1995). 
 195. MRO Commc’ns, Inc. v. AT&T Co., 197 F.3d 1276, 1280 (9th Cir. 1999). 
 196. See Street, supra note 149, at 354. 
 197. See Hanna v. Plumer, 380 U.S. 460, 472 (1965). 
 198. See Marek v. Chesny, 473 U.S. 1, 16 (1985) (“We previously have been 
confronted with ‘superficially appealing argument[s]’ strikingly similar to those 
adopted by the Court today, and we have found that they ‘cannot survive careful 
consideration.’”) (Brennan, J., dissenting) (quoting Roadway Express, Inc. v. 
Piper, 447 U.S. 752, 758 (1980)). 
 199. See supra notes 172–78 and accompanying text. 
 200. Gasperini v. Ctr. for Humanities, Inc., 518 U.S. 415, 432–36 (1996); Walker 
v. Armco Steel Corp., 446 U.S. 740, 748 (1980). 
03__ROESCH.DOC 6/5/2006  4:00 PM 
112 ALASKA LAW REVIEW [23:81 
concluded that the rules actually collide when their text is similar.  
Finally, cases taking the “piecemeal” approach have yet to explain 
adequately why Federal Rule 68 does not foreclose operation of 
state offer of judgment rules in instances where it does not author-
ize costs, i.e., offers by plaintiffs and offers by defendants who ob-
tain judgment. 
2. Overbroad Characterization of the Federal Rule’s Scope.  
The “direct collision” language in Hanna may also have the oppo-
site effect, inviting a court to define the federal rule broadly, with-
out conducting a background inquiry into its purpose.  It is tempt-
ing to characterize all issues surrounding Federal Rule 68 and state 
offer of judgment rules as “offers of judgment.”  But Walker fore-
closes such characterization as an analytical technique.201  More-
over, as this Comment demonstrates, there is often more going on 
behind the scenes of the federal and state rules than is reflected by 
such a broad characterization. 
Nor is the force of the Walker-Gasperini command to look to 
the purpose and intended scope diminished by recent emphasis on 
text in the Supreme Court’s statutory interpretation jurispru-
dence.202  Legislative history remains relevant as “context” in de-
termining the meaning of a statute.203  Nowhere is context more im-
portant than in the Gasperini inquiry into whether the purpose and 
intended scope of two competing rules are in direct collision. 
Recent Supreme Court jurisprudence has reaffirmed the 
Court’s commitment to and belief in the federal judiciary’s institu-
tional capacity for balancing issues of federal and state law.  In 
Grable & Sons Metal Products v. Darue Engineering & Manufac-
turing,204 the Court held that cases raising important federal issues 
fall under the federal question jurisdiction conferred by 28 U.S.C. § 
1331, even though the federal question does not appear on the face 
of the complaint.205  In determining whether the case raised an im-
portant federal question, the Court considered whether the federal 
statute was an essential element of the claim and actually in dis-
pute, and then gauged the federal government’s interest in having 
the dispute adjudicated in federal court.206  In doing so, the Grable 
 
 201. See Walker, 446 U.S. at 748. 
 202. See, e.g., City of Rancho Palos Verdes v. Abrams, 544 U.S. 113 , 125 S.Ct. 
1453 (2005). 
 203. See id. at 1462–63 (Breyer, J., concurring); id. at 1463–65 (Stevens, J., con-
curring). 
 204. 125 S.Ct. 2363 (2005). 
 205. Id. at 2367. 
 206. Id. at 2368. 
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Court demonstrated that the federal judiciary is capable of making 
considered decisions about the relative importance of state and 
federal interests in the context of determining whether a federal 
court is the proper forum for a claim to be heard.  Thus, there is no 
reason to think the Supreme Court has abandoned its belief that 
the federal judiciary is capable of making considered decisions 
about the intended scope and purpose of federal laws and the fed-
eral judicial system’s capability of accommodating substantive state 
law. 
3. The Construction of Hybrid Rights.  The federal judiciary 
also may not create “hybrid” rights—incorporating some part of 
the state’s rule but not others.  This practice is really a subset of the 
piecemeal approach, but it is different enough to merit separate 
discussion.  For example, the Nicolaus court held that because Fed-
eral Rule 68 did not mention plaintiffs’ offers of judgment, state 
law could apply to such offers.207  The court then faced a dilemma 
because while defendants were not entitled to attorneys’ fees upon 
making a successful offer of judgment under Federal Rule 68, 
plaintiffs would be entitled to attorneys’ fees by virtue of having 
made a successful offer under the Nevada rule.208  In order to main-
tain a balance between plaintiffs and defendants and to discourage 
forum shopping, the court held that the Nevada offer of judgment 
rule could only apply to award plaintiff’s costs and not attorneys’ 
fees.209  As a court already has discretion to allow costs to the pre-
vailing party under Federal Rule 54, it is unclear how much plain-
tiffs benefit from this “application” of state law. 
Like the piecemeal approach and the overly broad characteri-
zation of the federal rule’s scope, the construction of hybrid rights 
is also appealing because it seemingly allows the court to fulfill the 
mandate of Walker and Gasperini that the state substantive rule 
should be accommodated if possible.  It places the court in a posi-
tion to assure fairness to the litigants, ameliorating the potential 
unfairness of the piecemeal approach. 
Nonetheless, the construction of hybrid rights is an unaccept-
able judicial practice.  First, it is unclear whether the federal judici-
ary possesses the institutional competence to make judgments gen-
erally reserved at least partly for state legislatures.  It is for the leg-
islature, usually advised by a state judiciary rules committee in a 
non-adversarial setting, to determine as a matter of policy the pro-
 
 207. Nicolaus v. W. Side Transp., Inc., 185 F.R.D. 608, 614 (D. Nev. 1999). 
 208. Id. 
 209. Id. 
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cedural “balance” between litigants.210  For example, although the 
Nicolaus court maintained a “balance” between plaintiffs and de-
fendants, it did so by eviscerating Nevada’s policy judgment to en-
courage settlement through offer of judgment-triggered attorneys’ 
fee awards.  This policy benefits not only the court system in which 
the litigation is pending, but has incidental benefits to the residents 
of Nevada.  In short, it is unclear, given the constraints that this ap-
proach assumes are imposed by the Federal Rules of Civil Proce-
dure, whether the court will be able to replicate the legislature’s 
chosen balance and promote the state’s policies. 
Second, judicial creation of a hybrid results in rules unin-
tended by both state and federal drafters.  Any judicial process that 
does not give effect to a legislative intent when two intentions have 
been expressed is deeply problematic. 
Third, the hybrid creation process in Nicolaus did not comport 
with the command of Gasperini.  In Gasperini, the Court examined 
whether the substantive state law could be accommodated by fed-
eral procedure.211  It contemplated no change to the substance of 
the state law but only to the manner in which it was administered.212  
In Nicolaus, the court altered the substance of the substantive state 
right in order to accommodate a perceived conflict with the federal 
rule.213 
Finally, it is unclear where the authority for this ad hoc rule-
making originates.  The creation of a hybrid rule, like the piece-
meal approach, assumes without adequate explanation that the 
federal rule does not occupy the field.  Moreover, the process of 
determining the partial application of state law closely resembles 
the process of federal common law-making.  According to the Su-
preme Court, federal common law-making is appropriate in non-
Erie situations in cases involving a “uniquely federal interest,” 
which has been so committed to federal control by the Constitution 
and laws of the United States that state law is preempted where 
conflicting.214  Preemption is necessary when there is a “significant 
conflict” between an identifiable federal policy and the operation 
of state law.215  In short, this process is what Erie prohibits.216 
 
 210. S.A. Healy Co. v. Milwaukee Metro. Sewage Dist., 60 F.3d 305, 312 (7th 
Cir. 1995). 
 211. See Gasperini v. Ctr. for Humanities, Inc., 518 U.S. 415, 426 (1996). 
 212. See id. 
 213. See Nicolaus, 185 F.R.D. at 613–14. 
 214. See Boyle v. United Techs. Corp., 487 U.S. 500, 507–08 (1988). 
 215. Id. 
 216. Not only are these precisely the circumstances in which Erie prohibits fed-
eral common law-making, but even if it were appropriate, “Boyle suggests the 
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Similarly, the hybrid approach recognizes the two potentially 
conflicting courses (the federal and state rules) and attempts to 
strike a balance between them.  The hybrid rule-making process, 
however well intentioned, is therefore essentially common law-
making.  The incorporation of state rules into the federal proce-
dural common law-making process does not satisfy the principle in 
Erie that substantive state law, rather than federal common law, 
should govern in federal diversity actions. 
V.  CONCLUSION 
With respect to rules based on underlying systems fundamen-
tally different from those governing the federal rules, extra caution 
must be exercised when determining the scope and function of the 
federal and state rules.  The Federal Rules of Civil Procedure were 
crafted to provide a uniform framework for adjudicating varying 
substantive rights.  But even this endeavor contemplates at least 
some underlying assumptions about the legal systems whose sub-
stantive rights are to be adjudicated in the uniform framework.  
When unique underlying systems of legal rights render those as-
sumptions inapplicable to a substantive right, it is unlikely that 
there will be a “direct collision” between the federal rule and the 
state law. 
Alaska’s unique fee-shifting structure requires special atten-
tion in interactions within the federal courts.  Although at first 
glance it appears that Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 68 forecloses 
application of Alaska Rule 68, at least in part, closer examination 
reveals that the federal rule leaves room for the Alaska rule to op-
erate. 
An examination of the treatment of state offer of judgment 
laws in federal diversity cases around the nation reveals several po-
tential pitfalls in what has become the initial inquiry in the Erie-
Hanna analysis.  First, a piecemeal approach to determining 
whether a direct conflict exists creates unhelpful precedent and 
may lead to inconsistent results.  Second, an overly broad charac-
terization of the federal rule’s purpose and intended scope may 
create a conflict where none exists.  Third, creation of hybrid sub-
stantive rights in an attempt to accommodate both state and federal 
interests is problematic.  Ultimately, there is no substitute for a 
 
utmost caution where a federal court seeks to displace a state law that does have 
important extralitigation objectives with a purely procedural federal common law 
rule, absent any explicit direction by Congress that it should.”  Floyd, supra note 
62, at 289. 
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thorough analysis of the intended scope and purpose of both the 
federal and state rules that are in apparent conflict. 
